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ABSTRACT
Many companies and organizations use firewalls to control the access to their network infrastructure. Firewalls are
network security components which provide means to filter traffic within corporate networks, as well as to police
incoming and outcoming interaction with the Internet. For this purpose, it is necessary to configure firewalls with
a set of filtering rules. Nevertheless, the existence of errors in a set of filtering rules is very likely to degrade the
network security policy. The discovering and removal of these configuration errors is a serious and complex problem
to solve. In this paper, we present a set of algorithms for such a management. Our approach is based on the analysis of
relationships between the set of filtering rules. Then, a subsequent rewriting of rules will derive from an initial firewall
setup – potentially misconfigured – to an equivalent one completely free of errors. At the same time, the algorithms
will detect useless rules in the initial firewall configuration.
Keywords: Network Security, Firewalls, Filtering Rules, Redundancy and Shadowing of Rules
1 Introduction
The use of firewalls is the dominant method for compa-
nies and organizations to segment access control within
their own networks. They are typically deployed to filter
traffic between trusted and untrusted zones of corporate
networks, as well as to police their incoming and outcom-
ing interaction with the Internet1.
Firewalls are network security components, with several
interfaces associated with the different zones of the net-
work. A company may partition, for instance, its network
into three different zones: a demilitarized zone (DMZ for
short), a private network and a zone for security admin-
istration. In this case, one may use a firewall with three
interfaces associated with these three zones, as well as a
fourth interface to control the access to the Internet.
In order to apply the filtering process, it is necessary to
configure the firewall with a set of filtering rules (e.g., the
set of filtering rules shown in Table 1). Each filtering rule
typically specifies a decision (e.g., accept or deny) that
applies to a set of condition attributes, such as protocol,
source, destination, and so on.
For our work, we define a filtering rule as follows:
Ri : {conditioni} → decisioni (1)
where i is the relative position of the rule within
the set of rules, decisioni is a boolean expression in
{accept, deny}2, and {conditioni} is a conjunctive set of
condition attributes such that {conditioni} equals A1 ∧
1Firewalls also implement other functionalities, such as Proxying
and Network Address Transfer (NAT), but it is not the purpose of
this paper to cover these functionalities.
2The decision field may also be a combination of both accept
and deny together with some other options such as a logging or
jump options. For reasons of clarity we assume that just accept and
deny are proper values.
A2 ∧ ... ∧ Ap, and p is the number of condition attributes
of the given filtering rules.
The following example3 shows the filtering rules of Table
1 using such a formalism.
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [20, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : (s ∈ [15, 45] ∧ d ∈ [25, 30])→ deny
R5 : (s ∈ [25, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
When processing packages, conflicts due to rule overlaps
can occur within the filtering policy. For instance, we can
see in Figure 1 a geometrical representation of the main
overlaps within the filtering rules of Table 1.
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Figure 1: Main overlaps within the rules of Table 1
To solve these conflicts, most firewall implementations
use a first matching strategy through the ordering of rules
3To simplify the example, the number of condition attributes,
i.e., p, is just two: (s)ource and (d)destination. We do not show the
condition attributes (p)rotocol, (sP)ort, and (dP)ort, because their
value will always be true.
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order condition decision
(p)rotocol (s)ource (sP)ort (d)estination (dP)ort
1 any xxx.xxx.xxx.[001,030] any xxx.xxx.xxx.[020,045] any deny
2 any xxx.xxx.xxx.[020,060] any xxx.xxx.xxx.[025,035] any accept
3 any xxx.xxx.xxx.[040,070] any xxx.xxx.xxx.[020,045] any accept
4 any xxx.xxx.xxx.[015,045] any xxx.xxx.xxx.[025,030] any deny
5 any xxx.xxx.xxx.[025,045] any xxx.xxx.xxx.[020,040] any accept
Table 1: Example of a set of filtering rules with five condition attributes.
– such as the order field shown in Table 1. This way, each
packet processed by the firewall is mapped to the decision
of the rule with highest priority. This strategy introduces,
however, new configuration errors, such as shadowing of
rules and redundancy. For our work, we define these two
general cases of firewall misconfiguration as follows.
Definition 1.1 Let R be a set of filtering rules. Then
R has shadowing if and only if there exists at least one
filtering rule, Ri in R, which never applies because all the
packets that Ri may match, are previously matched by an-
other rule, or combination of rules, with higher priority in
order.
Definition 1.2 Let R be a set of filtering rules. Then
R has redundancy if and only if there exists at least one
filtering rule, Ri in R, such that the following conditions
hold: (1) Ri is not shadowed by any other rule; (2) when
removing Ri from R, the filtering result, i.e., the security
policy, does not change.
The discovering and removal of both redundancy and
shadowing is a serious problem which must be solved since
a misconfigured set of filtering rules, if not handled cor-
rectly, is very likely to cause packets to be subject to the
wrong actions, and to lead to a weak security policy.
In this paper, we present a set of algorithms for the
discovering and removal of both redundancy and shadow-
ing of rules. Our main objective is the following. Given
a specific firewall setup, we want to analyze the existing
firewall configuration to check whether there is errors in
such a configuration, i.e., the set of filtering rules presents
shadowing or redundancy as defined above.
Our approach is based on the relationships between the
filtering rules’ parameters: coincidence, disjunction and
inclusion. We use a rule transformation process that de-
rive from a set of filtering rules to an equivalent and valid
one that is completely free of both shadowing and redun-
dancy.
The advantages of our proposal are threefold. First of
all, after rewriting the rules one can verify that there is no
redundancy nor shadowing in the resulting firewall config-
uration. Each redundant or shadowed rule – considered
as useless during the audit process – will be removed from
the initial set of filtering rules.
On the second hand, when such a detection occurs the
discovering process will provide an evidence of error to
the administration console. This way, the security officer
in charge of the network can check from the initial spec-
ification, in order to verify the correctness of the whole
process.
On the third hand, the resulting rules are completely
disjoint, i.e., the ordering of rules is no longer relevant.
Hence, one can perform a second transformation in a pos-
itive or negative manner: positive, when generating only
permissions; and negative, when generating only prohibi-
tions. Positive rewriting can be used in a closed policy
whereas negative rewriting can be used in case of an open
policy.
After performing this second rewriting, the security of-
ficer will have a clear view of the accepted traffic (in the
case of positive rewriting) or the rejected traffic (in the
case of negative rewriting).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
starts with an analysis of some related work. Then, Sec-
tion 3 presents our algorithms and introduces some exam-
ples to validate the correctness of our approach. Section
4 analyzes the complexity of our proposed algorithms and
overviews a performance study. Section 5 closes the pa-
per with some conclusions and gives an outlook on future
work.
2 Related Work
A first approach to get a firewall configuration free of er-
rors is by applying a formal security model to express
the network security policy. In [5], for example, a for-
mal model is presented with this purpose. This way, a set
of filtering rules, whose syntax is specific to a given fire-
wall, may be generated using a transformation language.
Nonetheless, this approach is not enough to ensure that
the firewall configuration is completely free of errors.
Some other proposals, such as [1, 7, 2, 8, 3], provide
means to directly manage misconfiguration. For instance,
the authors in [1] consider that, in a configuration set, two
rules are in conflict when the first rule in order matches
some packets that match the second rule, and the second
rule also matches some of the packets that match the first
rule.
This approach is very limited since it does not detect
what we consider serious misconfiguration errors, i.e., re-
dundancy and shadowing of rules (cf. Section1, Def. 1.1
and Def. 1.2). What they detect is just a particular case
of wrongly defined rules which cause ambiguity in the fire-
wall configuration, and that is more efficiently defined as
a combination of both redundancy and shadowing.
In [7], two new cases of misconfiguration are considered.
First, a rule Rj is defined as backward redundant if and
only if there exists another rule Ri with higher priority in
order such that all the packets that match rule Rj also
match rule Ri. On the other hand, a rule Ri is defined as
forward redundant if and only if there exists another rule
Rj with the same decision and less priority in order such
that the following conditions hold: (1) all the packets that
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match Ri also match Rj ; (2) for each rule Rk between Ri
and Rj , and that matches all the packets that also match
rule Ri, Rk has the same decision as Ri.
Although this approach seems to head in the right di-
rection, we consider our definitions (cf. Section1, Def. 1.1
and Def. 1.2) simpler and more general, because all pos-
sible backward and forward redundant rules are specific
cases of both redundancy and shadowing, but not vice
versa. For instance, given the following set of rules:
R1 : s ∈ [10, 50]→ deny
R2 : s ∈ [40, 70]→ accept
R3 : s ∈ [50, 80]→ accept
Since rule R2 comes after rule R1, rule R2 only applies over
the interval [51, 70] – i.e., R2 is redundant with respect
to rule R3. Their detection proposal, as defined above,
cannot detect the redundancy of rule R2. Therefore, we
point out this work as incomplete.
To our best knowledge, the authors of the firewall policy
advisor [2, 3] propose the most efficient set of techniques
and algorithms to detect redundancy and shadowing in
different firewall configuration setups. In addition to the
discovery process, their approach also attempts an optimal
insertion of arbitrary rules into an existing configuration,
through a tree based representation of the filtering criteria.
Nonetheless, and even though the efficiency of their
proposed discovering algorithms and techniques is very
promising, we also consider this approach as incomplete.
On the one hand, their approach is too weak since,
given a misconfigured firewall, their discovering algorithms
could not detect all the possible errors. For example, given
the following set of rules:
R1 : s ∈ [10, 50]→ accept
R2 : s ∈ [40, 90]→ accept
R3 : s ∈ [30, 80]→ deny
their approach cannot detect the shadowing over rule R3
due to the union of rules R1 and R2.
On the other hand, the authors do not cover, intention-
ally, an automatic rewriting of rules to correct the discov-
ered errors. This way, it is the security officer who should
perform the final changes.
Summing up, we believe that none of the identified re-
lated work provides a complete discovering of both redun-
dancy and shadowing of rules – which are the cases we
consider serious errors within firewalls configurations – as
well as a proper handling of such a misconfiguration.
3 Proposed Algorithms
3.1 Detection Process
As pointed out in Section 1, our main objective is the dis-
covering of both shadowing and redundancy errors inside
an initial set of filtering rules R. Such a detection process
is a way to alert the security officer in charge of the net-
work about these configuration errors, as well as to remove
all the useless rules in the initial firewall configuration.
The data to be used for the detection process is the
following. A set of rules R as a dynamic linked-list4 of
initial size n, where n equals count(R), and where each
4A dynamic linked-list is a pointer-based data structure that can
be used to properly represent the abstract notion of a dynamic list.
element is an associative array5 with the strings condition,
decision, shadowing, and redundancy as keys to access
each necessary value.
To simplify, we assume one can access a linked-list
through the operator Ri, where i is the relative position re-
garding the initial list size – count(R). We also assume one
can add new values to the list as any other normal variable
does (element ← value), as well as to remove elements
through the addition of an empty set (element← ∅). The
internal order of elements from the linked-list R keeps with
the relative ordering of rules.
In turn, each element Ri[condition] is an indexed
array6 of size p containing the set of conditions of
each rule; each element Ri[decision] is a boolean vari-
able whose values are in {accept, deny}; each element
Ri[shadowing] is a boolean variable in {true, false}; each
element Ri[redundancy] is another boolean variable in
{true, false}. Both shadowing and redundancy variables
of each rule are initialized to false by default.
For reasons of clarity, we split the whole detection pro-
cess and the removal of misconfiguration in two different
processes. Thus, we define a main detection function (Al-
gorithm 1), whose input is the initial set of filtering rules,
R, and an auxiliary function (Algorithm 2) whose input is
two rules, A and B. Once executed, this auxiliary function
returns a further rule, C, whose set of condition attributes
is the exclusion of the set of conditions from A over B. In
order to simplify the representation of this second algo-
rithm (cf. Algorithm 2), we use the notation Ai as an
abbreviation of the variable A[condition][i], an the nota-
tion Bi as an abbreviation of the variable B[condition][i]
– where i in [1, p].
We recall that the output of the main detection function
is the set which results as a transformation of the initial
set R. This new set is equivalent to the initial one, R,
and all its rules are completely disjoint. Therefore, the
resulting set is free of both redundancy and shadowing of
rules, as well as any other possible configuration error.
Algorithm 1: detection(R)
begin
for i← 1 to (count(R)− 1)
do
for j ← (i + 1) to count(R)
do
Rj ← exclusion (Rj ,Ri);
if Rj [condition] = ∅
then
Rj [shadowing]← true;
end
end
end
end
5Associative arrays – also known as a map, lookup table, or dictio-
nary – have strings as keys and behave more like two-column tables,
where the first column is the key to access the value of the second
column.
6For our algorithms, we assume that the keys of an indexed array
are integers, beginning at 1, and where one can identify the elements
by their position.
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Algorithm 2: exclusion(B,A)
begin
C[condition]← ∅;
C[decision]← B[decision];
C[shadowing]← false;
C[redundancy]← false;
forall the elements of A[condition] and
B[condition] do
if ((A1 ∩B1) 6= ∅ and
(A2 ∩B2) 6= ∅ and . . .
. . . and (Ap ∩Bp) 6= ∅)
then
C[condition]← C[condition] ∪
{(B1 −A1) ∧B2 ∧ ... ∧Bp,
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ (B2 −A2) ∧ ... ∧Bp,
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ (A2 ∩B2) ∧ (B3 −A3) ∧ ... ∧Bp,
...
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ ... ∧ (Ap−1 ∩Bp−1) ∧ (Bp −Ap)};
else
C[condition]←
(C[condition] ∪B[condition]);
end
end
return C;
end
3.1.1 Applying the Algorithms
This section gives a short outlook on applying algorithms
1 and 2 over some representative examples.
Let us start applying the function exclusion (Algorithm
2) over a set of two rules Ri and Rj , each one of them
with two condition attributes – (s)ource and (d)estination
– and where rule Rj has less priority in order than rule
Ri. In this first example:
Ri[condition] = (s ∈ [80, 100]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 50])
Rj [condition] = (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 50])
since (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∩ (s ∈ [80, 100]) equals ∅, the condi-
tion attributes of rules Ri and Rj are completely indepen-
dent. Thus, the applying of exclusion(Rj , Ri) is equal to
Rj [condition].
The following three examples show the same execution
over a set of condition attributes with different cases of
conflict. A first case is the following:
Ri[condition] = (s ∈ [1, 60]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 30])
Rj [condition] = (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 50])
where there is a main overlap of attribute s from
Ri[condition] which completely excludes the same at-
tribute on Rj [condition]. Then, there is a second overlap
of attribute d from Ri[condition] which partially excludes
the range [1, 30] into attribute d of Rj [condition], which
becomes d in [31, 50]. This way, exclusion(Rj , Ri) ←
{(s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [31, 50])}7. In this other example:
Ri[condition] = (s ∈ [1, 60]) ∧ (d ∈ [20, 30])
Rj [condition] = (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 50])
there is two simple overlaps of both attributes s
and d from Ri[condition] to Rj [condition], such
7For reasons of clarity, we do not show the first empty set corre-
sponding to the first overlap. If shown, the result should become as
follows: exclusion(Rj , Ri)← {∅, (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [31, 50])}.
that exclusion(Rj , Ri) becomes {(s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈
[1, 19]), (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [31, 50])}.
A more complete example is the following,
Ri[condition] = (s ∈ [10, 40]) ∧ (d ∈ [20, 30])
Rj [condition] = (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 50])
where exclusion(Rj , Ri) becomes {(s ∈ [1, 9]) ∧ (d ∈
[1, 50]), (s ∈ [41, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 50]), (s ∈ [10, 40]) ∧ (d ∈
[1, 19]), (s ∈ [10, 40]) ∧ (d ∈ [31, 50])}.
Regarding a full exclusion, let us show the following
example,
Ri[condition] = (s ∈ [1, 60]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 60])
Rj [condition] = (s ∈ [1, 50]) ∧ (d ∈ [1, 50])
where the set of condition attributes of rule Ri completely
excludes the ones of rule Rj . Then, the applying of
exclusion(Rj , Ri) becomes an empty set (i.e., {∅, ∅} = ∅).
Hence, on a further execution of Algorithm 1 the shadow-
ing field of rule Rj (initialized as false by default) would
become true (i.e., Rj [shadowing]← true).
To conclude this section, let us show a complete exe-
cution of algorithms 1 and 2 over a set of filtering rules
based on Table 1 – whose main overlaps have been previ-
ously shown in Figure 1.
/ ∗motivation example ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [20, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : (s ∈ [15, 45] ∧ d ∈ [25, 30])→ deny
R5 : (s ∈ [25, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ step 1 ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [31, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : (s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [25, 30])→ deny
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ step 2 ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [31, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : {(s ∈ [61, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45]),
(s ∈ [40, 60] ∧ d ∈ [20, 24]),
(s ∈ [40, 60] ∧ d ∈ [36, 45])} → accept
R4 : ∅ → deny
R5 : {(s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 24]),
(s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [36, 40])} → accept
/ ∗ step 3 = step 4 = resulting rules ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [31, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : {(s ∈ [61, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45]),
(s ∈ [40, 60] ∧ d ∈ [20, 24]),
(s ∈ [40, 60] ∧ d ∈ [36, 45])} → accept
R5 : {(s ∈ [31, 39] ∧ d ∈ [20, 24]),
(s ∈ [31, 39] ∧ d ∈ [36, 40])} → accept
/ ∗ warnings ∗ /
R4[shadowing] = true
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3.2 Correctness of the Algorithms
Definition 3.1 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 1 to R.
Lemma 3.2 Let Ri : conditioni → decisioni and
Rj : conditionj → decisionj be two filtering rules.
Then {Ri, Rj} is equivalent to {Ri, R′j} where R′j ←
exclusion(Rj , Ri).
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Theorem 3.3 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 1 to R. Then R and Tr(R) are equivalent.
Lemma 3.4 Let Ri : conditioni → decisioni and Rj :
conditionj → decisionj be two filtering rules. Then rules
Ri and R
′
j, where R
′
j ← exclusion(Rj , Ri) will never si-
multaneously apply to any given packet.
Theorem 3.5 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 1 to R. Then ordering the rules in Tr(R) is no
longer relevant.
Theorem 3.6 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 1 to R. Then Tr(R) is free from both shadowing
and redundancy.
3.3 Complete Detection
Up to now, the result of Algorithm 1 offers a set of filtering
rules, Tr(R), equivalent to an initial set of rules R, and
completely free of any possible relation between its rules.
Nevertheless, there is a limitation on such an algorithm
regarding the reporting of redundancy – just the existence
of shadowing is reported to the security officer. Therefore,
we need to modify this algorithm in order to also detect
redundancy in R.
The purpose of this section is to solve this limitation, by
presenting a second manner to completely discover both
shadowing and redundancy errors into the initial set of
filtering rules, R, based on the techniques and results pre-
viously shown in Section 3.1.
The reporting of redundancy is much more complex
than the task of reporting shadowing. To properly over-
come this complexity, we first divide the whole process in
two different algorithms (Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4).
The first algorithm (cf. Algorithm 3) is a boolean func-
tion in {true, false}, which, in turn, applies the transfor-
mation exclusion (cf. Section 3.1, Algorithm 2) over a set
of filtering rules to check whether the rule obtained as a
parameter is potentially redundant.
The second algorithm (cf. Algorithm 4) performs the
whole process of detecting and removing both redundancy
and shadowing, and is also split in two different phases.
During the first phase, a set of shadowing rules are de-
tected and removed from a top-bottom scope, by itera-
tively applying Algorithm 2 – when the decision field of
the two rules is different. Let us notice that this stage of
detecting and removing shadowed rules is applied before
the detection and removal of proper redundant rules.
8A set of proofs to validate the theorems and lemmas of this
section is provided in [6].
Algorithm 3: testRedundancy(R,i)
begin
test← false;
j ← (i + 1);
temp← Ri;
while ¬test and (j ≤ count(R))
do
if temp[decision] = Rj [decision]
then
temp← exclusion(temp,Rj);
if temp[condition] = ∅
then
test← true;
end
end
j ← (j + 1);
end
return test;
end
Algorithm 4: completeDetection(R)
begin
/* Phase 1 */
for i← 1 to (count(R)− 1) do
for j ← (i + 1) to count(R) do
if Ri[decision] 6= Rj [decision] then
Rj ← exclusion (Rj ,Ri);
if Rj [condition] = ∅ then
Rj [shadowing]← true;
end
end
/* Phase 2 */
for i← 1 to (count(R)− 1) do
if testRedundancy (R, i) then
Ri[condition]← ∅;
Ri[redundancy]← true;
else
for j ← (i + 1) to count(R) do
if Ri[decision]=Rj[decision] then
Rj ←exclusion (Rj ,Ri);
if (¬Rj [redundancy] and
Rj[condition] = ∅) then
Rj [shadowing]← true;
end
end
end
end
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The resulting set of rules is then used when applying the
second phase, also from a top-bottom scope. This stage is
performed to detect and remove proper redundant rules,
as well as to detect and remove all the further shadowed
rules resulting during the latter process.
As a result of the whole execution, the initial set of
rules, R, is transformed into an equivalent set, Tr(R),
whose rules are completely disjoint. Furthermore, all the
discovery of both shadowing and redundancy is reported
to the security officer, who may verify the whole process.
3.3.1 Applying the Algorithms
In this section we give an outlook on the full execution of
the extended algorithms (Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4)
over a set of filtering rules based on Table 1 – whose main
overlaps have been previously shown in Figure 1.
/ ∗ phase 1, step = 1 ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [31, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : (s ∈ [15, 45] ∧ d ∈ [25, 30])→ deny
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ phase 1, step = 2, 3, 4 ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [31, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : (s ∈ [15, 30] ∧ d ∈ [25, 30])→ deny
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ phase 2, step = 1 ∗ /
/ ∗ testRedundancy(R1) = false ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : (s ∈ [31, 60] ∧ d ∈ [25, 35])→ accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : ∅ → accept
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ phase 2, step = 2 ∗ /
/ ∗ testRedundancy(R2) = true ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : ∅ → accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : ∅ → accept
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 45] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ phase 2, step = 3 ∗ /
/ ∗ testRedundancy(R3) = false ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : ∅ → accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : ∅ → accept
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 39] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ phase 2, step = 4, 5 ∗ /
/ ∗ testRedundancy(R4) = false ∗ /
/ ∗ testRedundancy(R5) = false ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R2 : ∅ → accept
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R4 : ∅ → accept
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 39] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
/ ∗ resulting rules ∗ /
R1 : (s ∈ [1, 30] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ deny
R3 : (s ∈ [40, 70] ∧ d ∈ [20, 45])→ accept
R5 : (s ∈ [31, 39] ∧ d ∈ [20, 40])→ accept
To conclude, let us recall that the following two warn-
ings will notice the security officer to the discovering of
both shadowing and redundancy errors, in order to verify
the correctness of the whole detection and transformation
process:
/ ∗ warnings ∗ /
R2[redundancy] = true
R4[shadowing] = true
3.4 Correctness of the Algorithms
Theorem 3.7 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr′(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 4 to R. Then R and Tr′(R) are equivalent.9
Theorem 3.8 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr′(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 4 to R. Then ordering the rules in Tr′(R) is
no longer relevant.
Theorem 3.9 Let R be a set of filtering rules and let
Tr′(R) be the resulting filtering rules obtained by applying
Algorithm 4 to R. Then Tr′(R) is free from both shadow-
ing and redundancy.
3.5 Complexity of the Algorithms
In the worst case, Algorithm 4 presented in this paper may
generate a large number of rules. If we have 2 rules with p
attributes, the second rule can be replaced by p new rules
in the worst case, leading to p + 1 rules.
If we now assume that we have n rules (n > 2) with
p attributes, then each rule except the first one can be
replaced by p new rules in the first rewriting step of the
algorithm. In the second rewriting step, the p rules that
replace the second rule are combined with the p rules that
replace rules 3 to n. Thus, each rule from 3 to n can be
replaced by p2 new rules. In the third step, the p2 rules
corresponding to rule 3 are combined with the p2 rules
corresponding to rules 4 to n. We can show that this may
lead to p3 new rules. And so on.
So, in the worst case, if we have n rules (n > 2) with p
attributes, then we can obtain 1+p+p2 + . . .+pn−1 rules
when applying Algorithm 4, that is p
n−1
p−1 rules.
Thus, complexity of Algorithm 2 is very high. However,
in all the experimentations we have done (cf. Section 4),
we were always very far from the worst case. First, because
only attributes source and destination may significantly
overlap and exercice a bad influence on the algorithm com-
plexity. Other attributes, protocoles and source and des-
tination port numbers, are generally equal or completely
different when combining configuration rules. Second, ad-
ministrators generally use overlapping rules in their fire-
wall configurations to represent rules that may have excep-
tions. This situation is closer to the normal case presented
in Figure 2 than to the worst case. Third, when shadowing
9A set of proofs to validate the theorems of this section is provided
in [6].
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Figure 2: Best, normal and worst ruleset examples
or redundancy situations are discovered by the algorithm,
some rules are removed – which significantly reduces the
algorithm complexity.
4 Performance Evaluation
We have implemented the algorithms described in Section
3 in a software prototype called MIRAGE (MIsconfigu-
RAtion manaGEr). MIRAGE has been developed using
PHP, a general-purpose scripting language that is espe-
cially suited for web services development and can be em-
bedded into HTML for the construction of client-side GUI
based applications [4]. MIRAGE can be locally or re-
motely executed by using a HTTP server (e.g., Apache
server over UNIX or Windows setups) and a web browser.
In this section, we present an evaluation of the per-
formance of MIRAGE applying the set of detection and
removal algorithms over the filtering rules of a simulated
IPv4 network.
Inspired by the experiments done in [2, 3], we simu-
lated in a first phase several sets of IPv4 filtering policies,
according to the three following security officer profiles:
beginner, intermediate, and expert – where the probabil-
ity to have overlaps between rules increases from 5% to
90%. Then, we processed in a second phase all these sets
of filtering rules within our prototype, in order to evaluate
its performance and scalability.
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Figure 3: Memory space evaluation
The whole of these experiments were carried out on
an Intel-Pentium M 1.4 GHz processor with 512 MB
RAM, running Debian GNU/Linux 2.6.8, and using
Apache/1.3 with PHP/4.3 interpreter configured. During
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Figure 4: Processing time evaluation
these experiments, we measured the memory space and
the processing time needed to perform algorithms 2, 3,
and 4. The results of these measurements are plotted in
Figure 3 and Figure 4. Although the plots reflect strong
memory and process time requirements, we consider they
are reasonable for off-line analysis, since it is not part of
the critical performance of a firewall.
5 Conclusions
There are two ways to set a firewall configuration free of
errors. A first approach is to apply a formal security model
– such as the formal model presented in [5] – to express the
security policy of the access control for the network, and
to generate the specific syntax for each given firewall from
this formal policy – for instance, by using XSL transforma-
tions from the formal policy to generate specific Netfilter
configuration rules [10]. The main advantage of this ap-
proach is the great confidence we have in the conformity
of the formal policy, and its translation into a specific fire-
wall configuration. Nevertheless, although a great number
of errors is avoided when using this formal approach, it is
still not ensured that all the possible errors are discarded.
A second approach – as the one presented in this paper
– is to apply an audit process to the set of filtering rules
of a given firewall – which expresses a specific network se-
curity policy – in order to detect configuration errors and
to properly eliminate them. In our case, the audit pro-
cess is based on the existence of relationships between the
condition attributes of the filtering rules, such as coinci-
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dence, disjunction, and inclusion. Then, our proposal uses
a transformation process which derives from an initial set
of rules – potentially misconfigured – to an equivalent one
which is completely free of misconfiguration.
Some other advantages of our approach are the follow-
ing. First of all, our transformation process verify that the
resulting rules are completely independent between them.
Otherwise, each redundant or shadowed rule considered as
useless during the process is removed from the configura-
tion. On the other hand, the discovering process provides
an evidence of error to the administration console. This
way, the security officer can check whether the security
policy is consistent, in order to verify the correctness of
the process.
The complete independence between rules, moreover,
enables the possibility to perform a second rewriting of
rules in a positive manner – only permissions – or in a
negative manner – only prohibitions. After performing
this second transformation, the security officer will have a
clear view of the accepted traffic – when positive rewriting
– or the rejected traffic – when negative rewriting.
Regarding a possible increase of the initial number of
filtering rules, due to the applying of Algorithm 2, it is
only significant whether the associated parsing algorithm
of the firewall depends on the number of rules. In this
case, an increase in such a parameter may degrade the
performance of the firewall. Nonetheless, this is not a dis-
advantage since the use of a parsing algorithm independent
of the number of rules becomes the best solution as much
for our proposal as for the current deployment of firewall
technologies. The set pruning tree algorithm is a proper
example, because it only depends on the number and size
of attributes to be parsed, not the number of rules [9].
The implementation of the algorithms in a software pro-
totype demonstrate the practicability of our work. We
shortly discussed this implementation, based on a general-
purpose scripting language [4], and presented an evalua-
tion of its performance. Although the experimental results
show that our algorithms have strong memory and process
time requirements, we believe that these requirements are
reasonable for off-line analysis, since it is not part of the
critical performance of a firewall.
As future work we are considering to extend our pro-
posal to a more complex firewall setup. The work stated
in this paper is based on the hypothesis that only one
firewall ensures the network access control. More investi-
gation has to be done when this role is assigned to more
than one network security component, that is a distributed
access control. Indeed, in particular, redundancy will not
systematically be considered as an error [2]. It may be
suited in order to avoid inconsistent decisions between fire-
walls used in the same security architecture to control the
access to different zones.
In parallel to this work, we also study the anomaly prob-
lems of security rules in the case where the security archi-
tecture includes firewalls as well as IDS (Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems). The objective is to avoid redundant or
shadowed filtering or/and alerting rules. Indeed, there is
a real similarity between the parameters of a filtering rule
and those of an alerting rules (signatures) so that we can
apply algorithms presented in both Section 3.1 and Section
3.3. Of course, this will depend on whether the firewall is
the first security component in the security architecture
that the packets encounter or it acts after the detection
intrusion component.
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A Correctness Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Let us assume that:
Ri[condition] = A1 ∧A2 ∧ ... ∧Ap, and
Rj [condition] = B1 ∧B2 ∧ ... ∧Bp.
If (A1 ∩B1) = ∅ or (A2 ∩B2) = ∅ or . . . or (Ap ∩Bp) = ∅
then exclusion(Rj , Ri) ← Rj . Hence, to prove the
equivalence between {Ri, Rj} and {Ri, R′j} is trivial in
this case.
Let us now assume that:
(A1 ∩ B1) 6= ∅ and (A2 ∩ B2) 6= ∅ and
... and (Ap ∩Bp) 6= ∅.
If we apply filtering rules {Ri, Rj} where Ri comes
before Rj , then rule Rj applies to a given packet if
this packet satisfies Rj [condition] but not Ri[condition]
(since rule Ri applies first). Therefore, notice that
Rj [condition]−Ri[condition] is equivalent to:
(B1 −A1) ∧B2 ∧ ... ∧Bp or
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ (B2 −A2) ∧ ... ∧Bp or
(A1∩B1)∧ (A2∩B2)∧ (B3−A3)∧ ...∧Bp or
...
(A1 ∩B1) ∧ ... ∧ (Ap−1 ∩Bp−1) ∧ (Bp −Ap)
which corresponds to condition of rule R′j =
exclusion(Rj , Ri). This way, if rule Rj applies to a
given packet in {Ri, Rj}, then rule R′j also applies to this
packet in {Ri, R′j}.
Conversely, if rule R′j applies to a given packet in {Ri, R′j},
then this means this packet satisfies Rj [condition] but
not Ri[condition]. So, it is clear that rule Rj also applies
to this packet in {Ri, Rj}.
Since in Algorithm 2 R′j [decision] becomes Rj [decision],
this enables to conclude that {Ri, Rj} is equivalent to
{Ri, R′j}. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3 Notice that if R is a set of fil-
tering rules, then Tr(R) is obtained by recursively apply-
ing transformation exclusion(Rj , Ri) when rule Ri comes
before rule Rj , which preserves the equivalence at each
step of the transformation, previously proved for Lemma
3.2. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4 Notice that rule R′j only applies
when rule Ri does not apply. Thus, if rule R
′
j comes before
rule Ri, this will not change the final decision since rule
R′j only applies to packets that do not match rule Ri. 
Proof of Theorem 3.5 For any pair of rules Ri
and Rj such that Ri comes before Rj , Rj is replaced
by a rule R′j obtained by recursively replacing Rj by
exclusion(Rj , Rk) for any k < j.
Then, by recursively applying Lemma 3.4, it is possible to
commute rules R′i and R
′
j in Tr(R) without changing the
final decision. 
Proof of Theorem 3.6 Notice that, in Tr(R), each
rule is independent of all other rules. Thus, if we consider
a rule Ri in Tr(R) such that Ri[condition] 6= ∅, then this
rule will apply to any packet that satisfies Ri[condition].
Hence, this rule is not shadowed.
Similarly, rule Ri is not redundant because if we remove
this rule, since this rule is the only one that applies to
packets that satisfy Ri[condition], then the filtering deci-
sion will change if we remove rule Ri from Tr(R). 
Proof of Theorem 3.7 Let Tr′1(R) be the set of
rules obtained after applying the first phase of Algo-
rithm 4. Since Tr′1(R) is derived from R by applying
exclusion(Rj , Ri) (cf. Algorithm 2) to some rules Rj in
R, it is straightforward, from Lemma 3.2, to conclude
that Tr′1(R) is equivalent to R.
Hence, let us now move to the second phase of Algorithm
4. Let us consider a rule Ri such that testRedundancy(Ri)
(cf. Algorithm 3) is true. This means that Ri[condition]
can be derived by conditions of a set of rules S with the
same decision and that come after in order than rule Ri.
Since every rule Rj with a decision different from the
one of rules in S has already been excluded from rules of
S in the first phase of the Algorithm, we can conclude
that rule Ri is definitely redundant and can be removed
without changing the final filtering decision. This way,
we conclude that Algorithm 4 preserves equivalence in
this case.
On the other hand, if testRedundancy(Ri) is false, then
transformation consists in applying exclusion(Rj , Ri) to
some rules Rj which also preserves equivalence. Thus, in
both cases, Tr′(R) is equivalent to Tr′1(R) which, in turn,
is equivalent to R. 
Proof of Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 3.9 As stated
out in the proof of both Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.6,
once shadowed and redundant rules have been removed,
every rule Ri is replaced by exclusion(Ri, Rj) where j < i.
Therefore, a similar reasoning enables to prove both The-
orem 3.8 and Theorem 3.9. 
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